Download PDF Judging Statutes

Download PDF Judging Statutes

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Judging Statutes

Download PDF Judging Statutes

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Review

"Robert Katzmann has written an illuminating and convincing book about the importance of ascertaining the actual intent of the legislators who draft and enact our statutes. It should be required reading for all lawyers confronting questions of statutory construction when advising clients or arguing such issues before judges." -Justice John Paul Stevens (Ret.) "Judge Katzmann is a dedicated public servant and a highly regarded judge. This compelling book is a welcome addition to the increasingly urgent conversation about how courts interpret what we do as members of Congress." -Senator Charles E. Schumer "Beautifully crafted, sensitive to the contrasting workways of Congress, executive agencies, and courts, and wise in its conclusions on this contested arena of judging, this book will quickly become the essential primer for judges, legislators, and citizens who aspire to more effective government. Katzmann, the first and only political scientist appointed to the federal bench, draws on his extraordinary knowledge and experience as a judge, scholar, law professor and interlocutor between the branches to produce this splendid brief treatise on statutory interpretation." -Thomas E. Mann, W. Averell Harriman Chair & Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution "The most erudite book any American judge has ever published on statutory interpretation, combining common sense with masterful scholarship. Katzmann relentlessly insists that judges approach statutes with an appreciation of Congress's primacy and with an understanding of the utility of legislative history. He does for statutory interpretation what John Marshall did for constitutional interpretation." -William Eskridge, Jr., John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School "Judging Statutes will profoundly influence the study and practice of statutory interpretation, combining sophisticated theoretical analysis with real-world experience. This book demonstrates the importance of an institutional perspective; interpretation includes Congress, courts, and agencies, as each engages with the statute and other branches." -Elizabeth Garrett, President, Cornell University "A judicial craftsman at the top of his art, Katzmann has written a must-read for all involved in the legislative and interpretive process." -Viet Dinh, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center "Katzmann makes a powerful case that judges should pay attention to legislative history--the words of members of Congress in debates, the committee reports explaining laws, and all of the source material that reflects how Congress really works. Moreover, Katzmann makes the apt point that textualism is especially inappropriate for judges who, like Scalia, profess to believe in judicial restraint-in the idea, that is, that judges should defer to the elected branches of government." --Jeffrey Toobin, The New Yorker "Judging Statutes, is both a tour de force and must reading for anybody following a particularly critical case, Halbig v. Burwell." --Norm Ornstein, The Atlantic"Judging Statutes leaves the reader with a better understanding of lawmaking, legal interpretation, and the roles of the various actors in this ongoing drama that affects all our lives." -Paul Vamvas, The Federal Lawyer"[Katzmann] can legitimately lay claim to greater knowledge and savvy than perhaps any sitting judge about how Congress actually writes laws and how the judicial branch reads and misreads them . . . Katzmann's crisply argued volume, Judging Statutes, has already attracted serious attention on the left and right." -Simon Lazarus, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas "Judge Katzmann's approach to statutory interpretation seems so plausible and balanced that it is hard to believe that anyone ever believed anything else." -Edward L. Rubin, Vanderbilt Law Review"Excellent and concise . . . Katzmann combines his judicial experience with his academic prowess to craft a gracious and erudite contribution to the national conversation about statutory interpretation . . . His admirable book is the essential new starting point for those interested in this old field." -Judge John Wiley, Los Angeles Daily Journal "Required reading for all who teach in the field. . . [C]ould set the framework for. . . legislation class or. . . as an independent reading assignment [for entering law students]." -Peter Strauss, Journal of Legal Education "Every judge, lawyer, law professor, and law student who interprets statutes - which is to say every judge, lawyer, law professor, and law student - should read this book carefully. To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter: read the book, read the book, read the book." -Judge Brett Kavanaugh, Harvard Law Review"A great book-called simply, Judging Statutes... What makes this particular book about statutory interpretation so engaging is the breadth of perspective that Judge Katzmann brings to it." -John F. Manning, Tulsa Law Review"Second Circuit Judge Robert A. Katzmann bring his unique professional career, including his distinguished experience and expertise in legislature, in academia, and as a jurist to his masterful book, Judging Statutes. With concise but lucid style, Judge Katzmann gives a thorough exposition of the analytical struggles a judge must go through while interpreting a less-than-clear statute." -Judge Michael M. Baylson, Judicature, Volume 100, No. 1. 74 (Spring 2016)

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About the Author

Robert A. Katzmann is Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The only jurist in the federal courts with a Ph.D in political science, throughout his career he has been concerned about how to make government function more effectively. At the time of his appointment to the federal bench, he was the Walsh Professor of Government, Professor of Law and Professor of Public Policy at Georgetown University; a fellow of the Brookings Institution; and president of the Governance Institute. Numerous awards for his public service, as well as his legal writing, have been bestowed on Judge Katzmann since joining the bench.

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Product details

Paperback: 192 pages

Publisher: Oxford University Press; Reprint edition (April 1, 2016)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 0190263296

ISBN-13: 978-0190263294

Product Dimensions:

5.5 x 0.5 x 8.2 inches

Shipping Weight: 7.2 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)

Average Customer Review:

4.5 out of 5 stars

10 customer reviews

Amazon Best Sellers Rank:

#773,361 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

For a number of years now, a somewhat ferocious debate has ranged around the issue of how federal judges should interpret ambiguous statutes. One school of thought, most prominently advocated by Justice Scalia, limits the judge's options to what is explicitly stated in the statute's text, dictionaries, and certain canons of construction. An alternative approach argues for the use of "legislative history" such as committee and conference reports to cast light on ambiguous provisions. In this fine book, Judge Robert Katzmann, Chief Judge of the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals, discusses these issues from the perspective of his long consideration of the topic. Before he was placed on the bench, the author spent many years at the Brookings Institution, The Governance Institution, and Georgetown University examining judiciary-legislative relationships, including publications on statutory interpretation. Despite the explosive nature of the topic, this book is coolly analytical and exhaustive in its consideration of related issues. But to be sure, the author is firmly in favor of reliance upon appropriate legislative history where necessary.One of the author's major themes is the need for the judiciary to have a better understanding of Congress and the lawmaking process. So, a valuable early chapter focuses upon this topic, especially the important role of legislative staffs. Another theme is that probably the best place to look for assistance in interpreting ambiguous statutes is to the administrative agencies that implement them. The legislative staffs intentionally generate legislative history material (particularly in committee and conference reports) to guide the agencies; they seem to get it, why not the courts? Ignorance of Congressional rules, norms, and practices is one big reason. So a very insightful chapter focuses upon this relationship, including discussion of the tools Congress utilizes to insure the agencies implement the intended purpose of statutes. These include confirmation hearings, investigations, authorization and oversight hearings, floor statements of key legislators, appropriation hearings and other devices. This material would seem to be of great potential value to courts as well.The core of the book is found in chapter 4, "Judicial Interpretation of Statutes." Here the author argues that the hallmark of interpretation should be a search for the purpose Congress intended in ambiguous statutes. He then discusses how legislative history can contribute toward ascertaining Congressional purpose. He places much emphasis upon the materials generated by staffs that is relied upon by legislators when voting, even if they have not thoroughly reviewed the proposed bill itself. This analysis is used in oversight of agencies; why should courts not rely upon it as well. This chapter also contains an excellent analysis of the arguments put forward by the "textualists" such as Scalia in rejecting legislative history. There is much insight and virtually no vitriol in this critical dimensions of the issue, despite the author's own position on the question. This is followed by a critique of textualism, particularly the judicial lack of familiarity of legislative processes and tools. An interesting section discusses the canons of construction so heavily relied upon by Justice Scalia and Bryan A. Garner in their important "Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts." The author points out that few staff members are familiar with these canons. Judge Richard Posner in my opinion really lacerated the canons argument in his recent "Reflections on Judging" book.One strong point of the book is that an entire chapter is devoted to three case studies in how the author and fellow second circuit judges interpreted ambiguous statutes, and how the Supreme Court viewed their handiwork. These cases well illustrate how different judges can reach opposing but reasonable interpretations of the same ambiguous statute. Finally, the author devotes a chapter to suggestions of how greater understanding can be promoted between Congress and the judiciary--another constructive contribution to the debate.Anyone seriously interested in this important topic needs to read this thoughtful book. In 100 pages of text and 38 pages of invaluable end notes, the author can thoroughly educate a reader as to the pros and cons of textualism v. purposivism. But the most important message remains: courts need to know a lot more about the procedures, techniques, and cues of Congress in order to do a satisfactory job of interpreting statutes.

Congress contains 535 members (plus several non-voting delegates from DC, Guam, and other territories), yet when a majority or even a supermajority votes to make a bill a law, compromise is involved at every step in the process - including reconciling a bill passed by the House and a similar one by the Senate. So then, of course, one would guess, it is easy to interpret these laws modified and amended from inception to adoption, right?Of course not. Judge Katzmann describes how, as a legislative worker, he helped put together bills that were ultimately voted into law, in their original form, or more likely not. The idea of legislative intent is thus something about which one can never be precise. When a majority of 535 people author a work, how can one say that "Congress" "intended" one thing? Katzmann, as a judge, describes how he must divine the Congressional purpose in adopting a statute, and see if the purpose is met when a dispute about its reading comes to his court. A judge may consider intent, but only to the extent that the language is not clear. But better it is to infer what Congress' purpose was in adopting a law, and when a dispute arises decide does the purpose of the law side with one interpretation or another. The judge gives three examples of where he and his brothers and sisters interpreted statutes, one interpretation of which the Supreme Court disagreed with.In simpler terms, yes, buses must stop before crossing the train tracks, but no one knows why Congress adopted that bill into law. Maybe there were a few members thinking about the bus drivers and their union. Its purpose, however, is to protect schoolchildren, so that is where the interpretive analysis begins.

Robert Katzmann has an ideal judicial temperament, and we should be grateful he's on the federal bench. I was delighted to hear that he had written a rebuttal to the views of Justice Scalia that statues should be viewed only by the words on the page (something I'm not quite convinced that Scalia adheres to, but that's his contention.) Judge Katzmann, who is a political scientist and worked with Congressional staffers to craft legislation before President Clinton appointed him to the Court of Appeals, thinks that courts should try to interpret statues according to Congress's intent. He provides in detail the process by which legislation is crafted and the things that may make laws ambiguous or contradictory in part. This should be required reading for anyone who wants to work on Capitol Hill or as a judge. The writing is clear and careful, but lay readers may find it a little too measured

Excellent book! Explains legislative and policy consideration for statute application in the most lucid manner. Holy Trinity case is, of course there! No statutory interpretation is possible without this absurdity doctrine case law. I have read a lot of literature on statutory construction. However what is amazing is that there is no commentary on the issue of Texaco using civil rights law of 1871, section 1983 to gain entry in the federal court. Civil rights laws violation, section 1983 alleged by Texaco against Texas state for a stringent appeal requirement. And then also worth listening to is reaction of Justice Marshal in that hearing. However, it is unclear as to how a law might not have been properly construed. Language of section 1983 might permit such filing by an aggrieved corporation, however there is no legislative or any policy support found for such a construction. Prof-Judge Katzman is an excellent scholar and brings to fold the ever increasing scope and inevitable interpretation of statute by the fourth government, the agencies, which is increasingly taking control of society for good or bad.

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